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Aggregate Quasi Rents and Auditor Independence:
Evidence from Audit Firm Mergers in China

ABSTRACT
Using a sample of audit firm mergers in China’s audit market, this paper provides evidence
on how auditor independence can be improved following audit firm mergers as a result of a
change in aggregate quasi rents that are exposed to risk (i.e., quasi rents at stake). The setting
allows us to examine directly the relationship between aggregate quasi rents at stake and
independence after controlling for the confounding effects of auditor competence, audit firm
brand name, and the self-selection problem that could exist in previous studies. We hypothesize
that auditors become more independent in the post-merger period only if the mergers increase
their aggregate quasi rents at stake. Proxying audit quality by the frequency of modified audit
opinions (MAOs), we conduct separate tests for two types of mergers: one with an increase in
aggregate quasi rents at stake and the other with little change in quasi rents at stake under the
institutional arrangements in China. We observe more MAOs after mergers, but only for the type
of mergers that increases auditors’ aggregate quasi rents at stake. Moreover, within this type of
mergers, the post-merger increase in the propensity of MAOs is positively associated with the
magnitude of expected change in aggregate quasi rents at stake. Our findings are consistent with
the theory that auditor independence is a positive function of aggregate quasi rents at stake.
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Aggregate Quasi Rents and Auditor Independence:
Evidence from Audit Firm Mergers in China
1.

Introduction

In an influential study, DeAngelo (1981) shows that auditors’ commitments to independence are
positively related to audit firm size. She argues that large audit firms have more aggregate quasi
rents, defined as audit fees in excess of audit costs, serving as collateral against auditors’
opportunistic behavior. Because auditors in large audit firms have “more to lose” if they fail to
report breaches in clients’ accounting reports, they are motivated to provide higher quality audit
services. Consistent with this argument, researchers have found that audit firm size is positively
correlated with audit quality. For example, Big N audits help to constrain firms’ earnings
management (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam 1998; Francis, Maydew, and
Sparks 1999). The Big N firms are also more conservative in issuing clean audit reports to their
clients (Francis and Krishnan 1999). Accounting information provided by the clients of Big N is
perceived to be more useful by the stock market (Teoh and Wong 1993) and employing Big N
auditors helps firms to lower the cost of capital (Pittman and Fortin 2004).
However, empirical evidence on the relationship between audit firm size and auditor
independence is confounded by a number of factors. First, as Watts and Zimmerman (1986) point
out, audit quality is a joint product of auditors’ competence (i.e., the ability of an auditor to
discover a breach) and independence (i.e., auditor’s propensity to report the discovered breach).
Dopuch and Simunic (1980a, b) suggest that auditors in large audit firms are more competent
than those in small firms. For example, large audit firms are better able to recruit graduates from
leading universities, hire reputable specialists from labor markets, and offer specialized training
to their staff. Peer reviews are also more prevalent and rigorous in large audit firms. Therefore,
audit firm size affects not only independence but also competence. This makes clear inferences on
the relationship between audit firm size and independence difficult.1
The second confounding factor is the brand name effect. The brand name investment model
(Klein and Leffler 1981) predicts that auditors are motivated to maintain audit quality to protect
their brand name once it is established. In previous studies, researchers generally compare the
audit quality between Big N and non-Big N firms, and use the membership of Big N to proxy for
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audit firm size. Since Big N are all brand name producers, the difference in audit quality between
Big N and non-Big N could be driven by Big Ns’ incentives to protect their brand names, even if
competence is constant among auditors and only independence matters.
Finally, the match between clients and auditors is not random. On the demand side, clients
select audit firms that best meet their needs to lower costs (Johnson and Lys 1990). On the supply
side, audit firms select their clients strategically to reduce audit risks (Shu 2000; Johnstone and
Bedard 2004). The non-randomness of auditor choice suggests that the observed audit quality
difference between Big N and non-Big N could be caused by this self-selection.2 Although
techniques such as the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure have been applied to correct the
selectivity problem, Francis (2004, p.354) cautions: “endogeneity and selection cannot be entirely
ruled out as an alternative explanation and more work is needed on this important topic.” This is
echoed by Francis and Lennox (2008), who underscore the pitfalls associated with the application
of the Heckman procedure in accounting and auditing literature.
Using data on audit firm mergers in China, we investigate the empirical relationship between
audit firms’ aggregate quasi rents at stake and auditor independence in a setting that allows us to
mitigate the above problems. As will be discussed in more details later, prior research on auditor
expertise suggests that mergers are not likely to affect auditors’ competence immediately.
However, mergers do have an immediate and significant impact on audit firm size and auditors’
aggregate quasi rents. Therefore, changes in audit quality immediately after mergers can be
attributed mainly to changes in auditors’ independence rather than competence. Moreover, we
investigate the difference in auditor independence between the pre- and the immediate
post-merger period of the same audit firms, instead of the cross-sectional difference between Big
N and non-Big N firms. Such a design is less subject to the brand name effect or the self-selection
problem.
Unlike the U.S. or other developed countries where the vast majority of public companies
are audited by the Big N, China’s audit market is dominated by small domestic audit firms during
our sample period. As predicted by the theory that merger waves result from the shocks to an
industry’s environment (Harford 2005), the economic and regulatory changes in China’s audit
market induced a large number of audit firm mergers in a short period of time. We are thus able to
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study the impact of mergers on audit quality in a similar regulatory environment for an important
economy. This is an important reason why we study this issue using data from China’s audit
market. In addition, the institutional setting in China allows us to split our sample into two groups
of mergers. In one group, mergers occur between two (or more) CPA firms licensed to audit listed
companies (referred to as multi-license mergers), and in the other group, a CPA firm with such a
license merges with non-licensed ones (referred to as single-license mergers). Since non-licensed
firms do not have listed clients and regulators focus their attention on listed companies and their
auditors in China, we expect that multi-license mergers would lead to a larger increase in quasi
rents that are exposed to risks (thus making auditors’ opportunistic behavior more costly) than the
single-license mergers.3 The difference between the two groups in the post-merger audit quality
change would thus manifest how quasi rents at stake affect auditor independence. Such a natural
experiment setting helps to test DeAngelo’s (1981) theory that auditor independence is positively
related to the aggregate quasi rents at stake.
We proxy auditor independence by audit opinions and examine the change in auditors’
propensity to issue modified audit opinions (MAOs) around the time of audit firm mergers. We
find that auditors issue more MAOs after the multi-license mergers. In addition, the increase in
MAOs is positively correlated with the magnitude of audit firm size change caused by the
mergers. However, there is no significant change in MAOs after the single-license mergers, where
we expect little increase in quasi rents at stake. The overall evidence supports the DeAngelo
theory.
This study also contributes to the literature in other respects. To a large extent, the mergers
of Chinese audit firms are induced by government policies attempting to enhance domestic
auditors’ ability to compete with the large international audit firms after China’s entrance to the
World Trade Organization (WTO). Our findings have policy implications to China’s regulators in
evaluating the effectiveness of their policies. Moreover, the monitoring role played by auditors is
crucial in mitigating agency problems in emerging markets, where the conventional corporate
governance mechanisms are weak (Fan and Wong 2005; Choi and Wong 2007). This study is thus
of interest to regulators on how to improve the corporate governance of public companies by
fostering auditor independence in China. After China joined the WTO and gradually opened its
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accounting market, international accounting firms have increased their presence in China’s audit
market. How mergers influence domestic auditors’ quality and the audit market structure in China
is highly relevant to these international accounting firms in designing their marketing strategy.
The next section presents the institutional background. In the third section, we develop the
hypotheses tested in the paper. Section 4 describes the sample data. The main empirical tests are
reported in the fifth section. The sixth section examines whether the results are open to alternative
explanations and analyzes the variation in post-merger improvement in audit quality. The final
section concludes the paper.

2.

Institutional background

The economic reforms in China since 1979 brought about structural changes in its national
economy. The entrance of foreign investment enterprises and the restructuring of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) into joint stock companies created demand for independent audits. In 1980,
the first Chinese CPA firm was established in Shanghai, followed by thousands of new firms
nationwide (Tang 2000). In the early 1990s, China established the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges. To perform audit services for listed companies, CPA firms must obtain a license from
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF).
Although the growth of the accounting profession in China has been rapid, most domestic
CPA firms remain small-scale. According to the CSRC (2001), there were 106 CPA firms licensed
to audit listed companies at the end of 1999 (before most mergers took place in China). On
average, each had less than 10 listed clients. Furthermore, the market share for the largest 20 CPA
firms was only 49.6% (60.4%) in terms of the number of listed clients (listed clients’ total
assets).4 At the turn of the millennium, the profession was concerned about whether domestic
firms could compete with the large international accounting firms when they were allowed to
operate directly in China after China’s accession to the WTO.5 As indicated by Mr. Yunwei Tang,
a senior partner of a leading CPA firm in China, many practitioner believe that one important way
to enhance their competitiveness is to increase firm size through mergers (China Securities News
2000).
The CPA firm merger wave was also activated by the advance in China’s economic reform.
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Guided by the philosophy of “crossing the river by touching the stones”, the Chinese government
first targeted small and medium-sized SOEs for restructuring into corporations (Sun and Tong
2003). As the government gains experience, more and more large SOEs are opened up for the
reform in the late 1990s. The government began to pay close attention to whether the supply of
quality audit services provided by domestic audit firms is sufficient to meet the increasing
demand from SOE reforms (China Finance and Economics Newspaper 2000). To induce CPA
firms to increase their size, the government issued several regulations. According to a regulation
issued in 1997, a CPA firm is eligible to apply for a license to audit listed companies if it employs
more than 8 individual CPAs who have passed additional professional examinations and obtained
the qualification from CSRC to sign audit reports for listed companies. In June 2000, CSRC and
MOF issued a new regulation, which increases this number from 8 to 20. The regulators also set a
new threshold by which CPA firms must have annual revenues over 8 million RMB yuan (Ren
Min Bi, the Chinese currency) to audit listed companies. As this exceeded many CPA firms’
revenues in 1999 and the number of qualified CPAs in China is limited, the most efficient way for
small CPA firms to retain their license to audit listed companies is to merge with other CPA
firms.6 In July 2000, the MOF promulgated Provisional Regulations on CPA Firms’ Performing
Audit Service in the Banking Industry, which stipulates that a CPA firm is not eligible to perform
audit service to selected banks if it employs less than 60 CPAs or its prior year’s revenue is lower
than 15 million RMB. Thus, to maintain a market share in the banking industry is also an
incentive for many CPA firms to merge.
Taken together, there are both market-based incentives and regulatory reasons for Chinese
CPA firms to increase firm size via mergers. The first merger appeared in 1999, when Zhong Rui
merged with Hua Xia. From 1999 to 2006, there are 68 merger cases involving CPA firms
licensed to audit listed companies. Largely because of these mergers, the number of licensed CPA
firms decreased from 106 in 1999 to 72 in 2006.

3.

Hypotheses development

3.1 The impacts of merger on a CPA firm’s willingness to compromise independence
To analyze the impacts of merger on auditor independence, we follow Chung and Kallapur’s
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(2003, 934-935) framework, which elaborates on DeAngelo’s original analysis. Specifically, the
value of audit firm A can be expressed as:
VA = QRc + QRAo,

(1)

where QRc denotes the present value of future quasi rents specific to client c, and QRAo denotes
the present value of all other future quasi rents of firm A. Consistent with DeAngelo (1981), we
define quasi rents as audit fees in excess of audit costs. To retain client c and earn QRc, A could
compromise independence since c can deny QRc to A by switching to other audit firms if A insists
on reporting a discovered breach. Denote the probability that client c will fire A for reporting the
breach as Pfire. When A selects to be independent, VA becomes:
(1 – Pfire)QRc + QRAo.

(2)

However, A risks QRAo by compromising independence since the value of audit depends on
its reputation and it could lose clients if such a malfeasance becomes known. Denote the
probability of a compromise by A being detected by the outside as PAdetect and the fraction of the
other quasi rents lost upon detection as αA. When A selects to compromise and retain c, VA is:
QRc + (1 – PAdetectαA)QRAo.

(3)

Chung and Kallapur (2003) suggest that, to maximize its wealth, A will compromise
independence when (3) is larger than (2). This condition can be simplified to:
PfireQRc > PAdetectαAQRAo.

(4)

That is, auditors will compromise independence to retain c when the expected loss of quasi
rents from c is larger than the expected loss of quasi rents from all other clients. Ceteris paribus,
audit firm’s incentives to compromise independence to a specific client hinge on the magnitude of
QRAo. Having more aggregate quasi rents serving as collateral, large audit firms have more to lose
if their opportunistic behavior becomes known.
Now assume that two audit firms, A and B, merge into a new firm, AB.7 We use the
superscripts B and AB to denote the parameters for B and the merged firm AB, respectively. When
AB chooses to acquiesce to client c, the value of the merged firm AB, VAB, becomes:
QRc + (1 – PAdetectαA)QRAo + (1 – PBdetectαB)QRBo.

(5)

If AB chooses to maintain independence, then VAB is:
(1 – Pfire)QRc + QRAo + QRBo.
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(6)

Thus, the condition for AB to retain c by compromising independence becomes:
PfireQRc > PAdetectαAQRAo + PBdetectαBQRBo.

(7)

Since PBdetectαBQRBo is strictly positive, the threshold for the merged firm, AB, to
compromise independence is higher than that of firm A. By aggregating the quasi rents of two
firms, merger essentially makes it more costly for auditors to compromise independence. We
therefore predict that post-merger audit firm is less likely to compromise independence to retain a
specific client.
Although Chinese auditors’ exposure to litigation risk is lower than their U.S. counterparts,
there are regulatory bodies in place to oversee the activities of audit firms. In emerging capital
markets, where the costs of verifying the circumstances of specific cases and interpreting statutes
are high, enforcement by regulators can be a more efficient way to foster the independence of
intermediaries than judicial enforcement (Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer 2001; La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 2000). Indeed, sanctions taken by China’s regulators, such
as the CSRC and MOF, against audit failure could be harsh. These sanctions include public
reprimand, warnings, fines, suspension or revocation of license to practice, and even
imprisonment. From 1993 to 2003, the number of sanctions taken by the CSRC against CPA
firms and individual CPAs are 29 and 71, respectively (CSRC, 2003). This suggests that
regulators do take actions to detect auditor’s opportunistic behavior and Pdetect should play a role
in auditors’ decision makings.
Suspension or revocation of license could result in the shut-down of CPA firms and thus the
loss of all quasi rents. For instance, in 1998, CSRC revoked the licenses of SiChuan and ShuDu
CPA firms for their audit failures in “Orient Boiler” and “Chengdu HongGuang”, respectively.
These two firms lost all of their listed clients in that year. The potential penalty imposed on audit
firms could also result in the dismissal of auditors by clients. In 2000, the CSRC investigated
Hubei LiHua CPA firm because some of its clients had been found to violate securities laws.
Being concerned with its tarnished reputation, other clients dismissed this CPA firm quickly
(Securities Times, 2001). These cases suggest that α, the fraction of other quasi rents lost upon
detection, could be quite large. In extreme cases where CPA firm’s license to practice is revoked,
α is 100%.
-7-

3.2 The impacts of merger on quasi rents
In the above analysis, we assume that merger per se does not change QRAo or QRBo. However,
merger could also affect the present value of quasi rents through its impacts on audit costs and
audit prices. Evidence from the merger literature suggests that future operating costs of merged
firms are likely to be lower since increased firm size is usually followed by improved production
efficiency arising from greater realization of the economies of scale, elimination of overlapping
facilities, etc.8 Consistent with this, Ivancevich and Zardkoohi (2000) and Sullivan (2002) report
that the 1989 mergers in the U.S. (creating Ernst & Young and Deloitte & Touche) lead to a
decrease in costs for the merged audit firms relative to their rivals.
In a highly competitive market, auditors price audit services marginally higher than audit
costs. If mergers lower audit costs, then auditors could also cut audit fees after mergers. While the
audit market for listed firms in China is competitive, only the licensed audit firms are allowed to
audit listed companies. In a market with entry barriers, mergers could lead to higher prices since
mergers reduce the number of suppliers and enhance the market power of the merged suppliers
(Stigler 1964). The new regulation promulgated by the CSRC and MOF in 2000 increase the
difficulty of entry for non-licensed audit firms. Moreover, the Chinese Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (CICPA) and the Pricing Bureau set a minimum limit on audit fee, which is
based on a percentage of a client’s total assets (e.g., see Beijing Pricing Bureau, 2001). This
minimum price ensures that auditors will not price below cost, which could affect audit quality.
As how the mergers affect audit pricing is an empirical question, we examine whether audit
price changes around mergers in the Appendix. The regression results suggest that there is no
significant change in audit fees immediately after mergers. In fact, audit fees increase slightly.
Furthermore, China’s minimum audit fee system generally provides a reasonable profit for audit
work. Therefore, any reduction in audit costs should improve CPA firms’ profits or quasi rents.
We therefore anticipate that mergers would increase auditors’ expected quasi rents and make any
compromise of independence to retain a client more costly to the auditors.9
3.3 Merger types and their impacts on quasi rents at stake
As mentioned before, not all audit firms in China have a license to audit listed companies.
Therefore, there are two types of mergers in our sample. One is mergers between two CPA firms
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that have licenses to audit listed companies (multi-license mergers), and the other is mergers
between a licensed firm and a firm without a license to audit listed companies (single-license
mergers).10 Recall that mergers would motivate auditors to improve independence because the
threshold for auditors to compromise independence increases from PAdetectαAQRAo before merger
to (PAdetectαAQRAo + PBdetectαBQRBo) after mergers. However, in single-license mergers, if A is a
licensed firm and B is a non-license firm, the net impact of mergers could be different from that
of multi-license mergers.
The regulatory oversight ensures that Pdetect takes a positive value in China. However,
regulatory penalties are primarily restricted to audit failure for listed companies, because listed
companies are more visible to the public and government enforcement focuses on audits of listed
companies and licensed CPA firms. This suggests that PBdetect is small in single-license mergers.
Licensed firms also differ from non-licensed firms in α, the fraction of other quasi rents lost upon
detection. Compared with the public firms audited by licensed firms, the clients of non-licensed
CPA firms in China should be less concerned about auditor reputation since they are all
non-public firms and are not really visible to the public. Being concerned with auditor switch
costs, such non-listed clients may not dismiss auditors even though auditors’ opportunistic
behavior has been detected by the outside. This suggests that the economic consequence of
detected audit failures, αB, should be lower if B is a non-licensed firm in the mergers.
Given that both PBdetect and αB are likely to be smaller if B is a non-licensed firm, the
magnitude of PBdetectαBQRBo, or the increase in the aggregate quasi rents at stake after mergers,
should be lower in single-license mergers than that in multi-license mergers. We therefore classify
all mergers into two types in testing the effect of mergers on auditor independence: multi-license
mergers where there are at least two constituent licensed CPA firms, and single-license mergers
where there is only one licensed CPA firm involved in the mergers. We expect the increased quasi
rents at stake after mergers would motivate auditors in the multi-license group to be more
independent. The first null hypothesis of this study is stated as:
HYPOTHESIS 1: There is no improvement in auditor independence after multi-license mergers.
While we expect that PBdetect and αB will be small in single-license mergers and thus this type
-9-

of merger will have little impact on auditor independence, the exact values of these parameters
are not readily observable to us. Therefore, we treat the effects of single-license mergers on
auditor independence as an empirical question and test the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2: There is no improvement in auditor independence after single-license mergers.
3.4 Merger and competence
While mergers may also affect auditors’ competence, such an effect should be small immediately
after the mergers because specific knowledge about a particular client of an audit firm is difficult
to transfer (Fama and Jensen 1983). Results from audit judgment research show that years of
experience help to explain auditors’ performance (Frederick and Libby 1986). Bonner and Lewis
(1990) further find that auditors’ client-related knowledge acquired from client or industry
specific experience provides the best explanations of auditor expertise. Moreover, auditors may
not share their specific knowledge straightly through general instruction. Bonner and Walker
(1994) demonstrate that instruction without experience (through practice and feedback) cannot
produce knowledge in training auditors. The laboratory evidence is corroborated by archival
research. Ferguson, Francis, and Stokes (2003) report that the fee premium for industry expertise
in Australia is only specific to offices where accounting firms are the city-level industry leaders.
The premium, however, is not enjoyed by other offices located in cities where they are not
industry leaders. This finding indicates that it is not easy to distribute expertise across offices
even within the same audit firm.
In our research design, we define the post-merger period as the first year in which auditors
issue audit reports in the name of the merged audit firms. These post-merger audit reports are in
effect issued by auditors only several months after mergers. Given the difficulty in transferring
such client-specific knowledge to other auditors immediately after the mergers and the
importance of such knowledge on auditor competence, we expect that any change in auditors’
competence immediately in the year of merger should be minimal. Indeed, one may even expect
mergers to cause temporary disruption and coordination problems, which could reduce auditor
competence in the merger year.
Moreover, single- and multi-license groups are quite comparable before mergers in terms of
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their listed clientele, as we will show later. If the competence effect exists, improvement in audit
quality should be observed in both groups. Evidence on improved audit quality specific only to
the multi-license mergers is more consistent with the idea that mergers improve auditor
independence by increasing auditors’ quasi rents at stake. We also conduct several tests in section
6.3 to investigate whether post-merger change in competence, if any, can explain our findings.

4.

Research method and sample data

Since the loss of quasi rents caused by regulatory sanctions can be significant in China, auditors
should issue modified audit opinions (MAOs) when appropriate to avoid such sanctions. Several
studies (DeFond, Wong, and Li 2000; Chen, Chen, and Su 2001; Chan, Lin, and Mo 2006; Wang,
Wong, and Xia 2008) also suggest that MAOs have reasonable power to capture variations in
audit quality in different research settings in China. Following these studies, we test the above
hypotheses by examining post-merger changes in auditors’ propensity to issue MAOs.
Operationally, we compare audit reports for the first fiscal year influenced by the audit firm
mergers (year 0), with those for the most recent three years prior to year 0 (year -3 to -1). We
define year 0 as the first year in which auditors issue audit reports in the name of the merged
audit firms. In anticipation of the mergers, auditors may have incentives to be more independent
in year -1. This would work against our tests. In other words, if this is the case, our findings will
be conservative. Observations after year 0 are not included so that improvement in auditors’
competence, which should emerge in a longer horizon, will not confound with the improvement
in independence.
From the Chinese Institute of CPAs and several leading financial newspapers, we collected
data for audit firm mergers that took place between 1999 and 2006. The identity of the CPA firms
and whether they have a license to audit listed companies were checked against Who Audits
China’s Securities Market published by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. Client
firms’ financial statement and stock market data are from the China Stock Market & Accounting
Research Data Base (CSMAR).
We identify 68 mergers from the CPA firms with a license to audit listed companies. To
ensure that we have pure pre-merger data, we delete 4 cases that took place after the firms
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consummated other earlier mergers. We also delete 5 cases where the CPA firms do not perform
audits to listed companies before mergers. The remaining 59 cases include 21 multi-license
mergers (MULTI hereafter) and 38 single-license mergers (SINGLE hereafter). Panel A of Table
1 shows the distribution of these two types of mergers by time. It is clear that a substantial
number of observations have year 0 in 2000.11 In section 6.1, we consider the possible impacts of
time-clustering on the results.
[Insert Table 1 here]
In Panel B, we report the mean number of firms involved in each type of mergers (MULTI
or SINGLE) and the types of CPA firm (licensed or not). By definition of the merger types, there
are more licensed CPA firms than non-licensed ones in the MULTI group. However, the last
column of Panel B suggests that there is no significant difference in the total number of CPA
firms involved between the two types of mergers.
To further examine the characteristics of the merging CPA firms, we show the mean value of
several variables measuring the size of listed clientele in Panel C: the number of listed clients, the
total assets of listed clients audited, and the number of CPAs that issue auditor reports to listed
clients. The pre- and post-merger data are assembled according to the CPA firms’ listed clients in
the most recent year before mergers and at the end of the merger year, respectively. When the
pre-merger data of the MULTI group are compared with those of the SINGLE group, we find no
significant difference between them in any measure. This suggests that audit firms in the MULTI
group are comparable to those in the SINGLE group in terms of listed clientele, had they not
merged. However, the post-merger data indicate that the MULTI group grows substantially in all
measures and it becomes significantly larger than the SINGLE group in terms of listed clientele.
The above analysis is based on listed clients. However, the SINGLE group acquires only
non-licensed firms, which do not have listed clients. It is thus inappropriate to infer that mergers
do not change firm size in the SINGLE group. An appropriate measure is the change in revenues
from both listed and non-listed clients around mergers. The CICPA occasionally published the
revenue rankings of Chinese CPA firms. From its website, we are able to collect the total
revenues (earned from both listed and non-listed clients) of 1999 and 2002 for 17 MULTI and 25
SINGLE mergers that took place in 2000.12 Panel D presents the mean annual revenues (in
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millions RMB yuan) for these firms. From 1999 (one year before mergers) to 2002 (two years
after mergers), total revenues for both groups grow considerably. Moreover, there is no significant
difference between two groups before or after mergers in terms of total revenues. By taking more
non-listed clients, CPA firms in the SINGLE group keep pace with those in the MULTI group in
terms of growth, although mergers affect the SINGLE group’s listed clientele only marginally.13
In sum, merger types (MULTI vs. SINGLE) affect the characteristics of constituent CPA
firms’ listed clientele differently. Given that two groups are comparable in listed clientele before
mergers and in overall firm size (in terms of annual total revenues) before or after mergers,
increase in firm size for the MULTI group is primarily caused by larger listed clientele whereas
that for the SINGLE group mainly results from taking more non-listed clients. Therefore,
different changes in auditor behavior after mergers between two groups of audit firms are very
likely due to different impacts of mergers on listed clientele, which is more subject to regulatory
scrutiny (i.e., higher values of the Pdetect and α parameters for listed clientele). In section 6.2, we
will analyze whether the audit firms’ choice of merger types endogenously affects our results.
There are 2,879 client firm-years audited by the merged CPA firms (including both MULTI
and SINGLE groups) from year -3 to 0. Because our focus is on whether auditor independence
improves after mergers, we require that: (1) client firms have at least one pre-merger observation,
and (2) the client firms are audited by the same CPA firm in the pre- and post-merger years. By
these criteria, we deleted: (1) 89 observations for client firms that are first listed in year 0 and
thus do not have pre-merger data; and (2) 442 observations for client firms that have changed
auditors in any year between year -3 and 0. The final sample includes 1,047 and 1,301 client
firm-years for the MULTI and the SINGLE groups, respectively.

5.

Analysis of auditors’ reporting decisions

We use the frequency of MAOs as proxy for audit independence, consistent with DeFond et al.
(2000), Chen et al. (2001), Chan et al. (2006), and Wang et al. (2008). Analogous to the U.S. or
International GAAS, the Chinese Independent Auditing Standards specify four types of audit
opinions: unqualified, qualified, disclaimer, and adverse. It is also stipulated that explanatory
notes can be used with unqualified opinions when deemed necessary. Although the CICPA
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interprets unqualified opinions with explanatory notes in a manner similar to the “emphasis of a
matter” in the U.S. GAAS, this type of audit report is often issued in place of a qualified opinion
in China.14 Consistent with previous studies, we classify auditors’ reports into two categories: (1)
clean reports, and (2) modified audit opinions (MAOs), including unqualified but with
explanatory notes, qualified, disclaimed, and adverse opinions. We present the relative frequency
of these MAOs for the population of Chinese listed firms from 1993 to 2006 in Figure 1 (there is
no MAO before 1993 in China). Consistent with DeFond et al. (2000), there is a significant
increase in MAOs in 1995, when the CICPA promulgated the first batch of independent auditing
standards. The relative frequency of MAOs reaches its peak at in 1999, decreases in the following
years, but stabilizes in recent years. Note that year 2000 is the event year 0 for most merger cases
in our sample, and the relative frequency of MAOs in this year for the whole population is lower
than that in the preceding years. This might work against finding evidence on increase in MAOs
in year 0 for our merger sample.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
5.1 Univariate analysis
Table 2 reports the χ2 tests on whether the frequency of MAOs is independent of CPA firm
mergers. In the pre-merger period, the proportion of MAOs is similar for the MULTI (Panel A)
and the SINGLE (Panel B) groups. For the MULTI sample, the proportion of MAOs in the
post-merger period is higher than that before mergers and the difference is significant at the 0.01
level in the χ2 test. We thus reject the first hypothesis (H1) that there is no increase in MAOs after
mergers for the MULTI sample. While there is also an increase in the proportion of MAOs in the
post-merger period in the SINGLE sample, we cannot reject the second hypothesis (H2) that there
is no post-merger change in audit opinions since the χ2 statistic in Panel B is not significant.
[Insert Table 2 here]
5.2 Multivariate analysis
To test our hypotheses in a multivariate setting, we estimate the following Logit model:
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MAO = α + βPOST + γ1CURRENT + γ2ARINV + γ3LEV + γ4TURN + γ5ROA + γ6LOSS

(8)

+ γ7AGE + γ8EM + γ9RET + γ10STDR + γ11Ln(TAST) + ε,
where MAO is coded one if the client firm receives an MAO, and zero otherwise. POST is a
dummy variable taking a value of one to indicate that the client firm observations are in year 0,
and zero for other years. Therefore, the coefficient on POST represents a change in the probability
of MAOs in the post-merger period.
Following prior studies on audit reporting in the U.S. (e.g., Dopuch, Holthausen, and
Leftwich 1987; Bell and Tabor 1991) and in China (DeFond et al. 2000; Chen et al. 2001), we
include a set of control variables in the Logit models. First, we include five financial ratios,
CURRENT (current assets divided by current liabilities), ARINV (receivables and inventory
divided by total assets), LEV (total liabilities divided by total assets), TURN (total sales divided
by total assets), and ROA (earnings divided by total assets). Generally, higher levels of
CURRENT, TURN, and ROA indicate lower audit risk. Thus, the coefficients on these variables
are expected to be negative. Since higher levels of ARINV and LEV are associated with higher
audit risk, their coefficients should be positive.
LOSS is a dummy variable indicating that the firm has reported a loss in a given year and is
expected to have a positive coefficient. Because Chinese firms are more susceptible to financial
distress after they exhaust the capital raised in the IPOs, younger firms are less likely to receive
MAOs in China (DeFond et al. 2000; Chen et al. 2001). Therefore, AGE, defined as the number
of years a company has been listed, is expected to have a positive coefficient. According to
China’s Company Law, firms will be delisted if they incurred losses for three consecutive years.
As Chinese firms that manage earnings to be slightly above zero to avoid being delisted are more
likely to receive MAOs (Chen et al. 2001), we use a dummy variable, EM, to control for this
effect. It is equal to one if the client firm reported a ROE between 0 and 1 percent, and zero
otherwise.15
In addition to the above financial statement variables, we include two stock market variables
that could influence auditors’ decisions. The market-adjusted stock returns for the fiscal year,
RET, is to control for news incorporated into stock returns but not yet recognized in earnings. The
coefficient on RET is expected to be negative. STDR is the standard deviation of residuals from
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the market model.16 This variable should capture risks that are not reflected in the financial
statement variables (Ali, Hwang, and Trombley 2003). Since risky firms are more likely to
receive MAOs (Dopuch et al. 1987), we expect STDR to have a positive coefficient. Finally, we
include the natural logarithm of clients’ total assets, Ln(TAST), in the regression. We expect the
coefficient on Ln(TAST) to be negative since large clients are usually less risky to the auditors due
to more stable operations and better internal control systems.
We transform all the continuous variables into cross-sectional percentile ranks. Specifically,
for each variable, we rank all firms in CSMAR by year and scale the percentile ranks (from 0 to
99) by 99. Thus the scaled ranks range from 0 to 1, with 0.50 indicating that the observation is at
the population median. This procedure is more efficient than alternative procedures such as log
transformations and sample trimming to avoid skewness and outlier problems (Lennox 2005).
Table 3 reports the mean of the raw values and scaled percentile ranks for these variables by
group (MULTI or SINGLE) and periods (pre- or post-merger). The univariate t-test is performed
to examine the difference between the two periods.17 For the raw values, the longer listing age
and larger size of the post-merger client observations reflect the sequential nature of data
(pre-merger data predate the post-merger ones) and the growth of client firms over time. We also
observe that post-merger observations have significantly lower current ratio and ROA, higher
leverage, and more volatile stock returns. This holds for both groups. However, for the percentile
ranks, we find no significant difference in the MULTI group between the pre- and the post-merger
data, except the AGE variable. Since the rank variables are based on the population of listed
companies, the difference in the raw values between two periods is mainly due to a general
change occurring across the board for all listed firms in China, rather than the financial
deterioration specific to the sample clients. In any event, these variables are included in the
regressions to control for possible impacts on audit opinions. Moreover, we analyze both the
MULTI and the SINGLE samples. As the time period of these two samples largely overlaps, if
there is a problem of omitting some time-varying variables that correlate with audit reporting, the
problem should manifest in both groups. However, as explained later, we find no significant
change in audit opinions after mergers for the SINGLE group.18
[Insert Table 3 here]
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Equation (8) is estimated for the MULTI and SINGLE groups separately and the results are
presented in Table 4. Since we use panel data, the regression standard errors could be biased if the
residuals are correlated time-serially or cross-sectionally. In the spirit of Petersen (2008), we
report the Z-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by client firms. For the MULTI
group, the coefficient on POST is significantly positive (p<0.01). This suggests that, ceteris
paribus, auditors in this group are more likely to modify audit opinions after mergers. To evaluate
the economic significance, we set all the variables except POST at sample mean and change
POST from zero to one. Such a change would increase the probability of issuing MAOs by 5.21%
(from 8.48% to 13.69%).
In contrast, the coefficient on POST is not significant in the SINGLE group. When setting all
variables except POST at the mean values for this sample, a shift from pre- to post-merger period
will change auditors’ probability to issue MAOs by only 0.92% (from 8.89% to 9.81%). Thus, we
can reject H1, but not H2. This supports our argument that improvement in independence after
mergers should only be observed in the multi-license group. The coefficients on most of the
control variables have the predicted signs, although some have unexpected signs (but not
significant).
[Insert Table 4 here]
5.3 Sensitivity tests
We perform several sensitivity tests to check the robustness of our findings. First, to be sure that
individual merger cases do not drive the results, we re-estimated equation (8) dropping each
merger case one at a time. As there are 21 (38) cases in the MULTI (SINGLE) sample, equation
(8) is re-estimated 21 (38) times. For the MULTI sample, the coefficient of POST is always
significantly positive at the 0.05 or better levels (results not tabulated). In contrast, this coefficient
is never significant at any conventional level for the SINGLE sample. Therefore, the main
findings of this study are not unique to individual cases.
Second, the dichotomous MAO variable does not differentiate various types of MAOs. Since
different types of MAOs may reflect auditors’ judgment on the fairness of clients’ financial
statements, we also re-define the dependent variable as an ordered-level variable, which is coded
from 0 to 4 for clean, unqualified but with explanatory notes, qualified, disclaimed, and adverse
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opinions, respectively. The ordered Logit regressions yield results qualitatively the same as those
reported. Some may argue that unqualified audit reports with explanatory notes are not an MAO.
However, excluding this type of audit reports from our sample does not affect our conclusion.
Third, in our sample selection, we require that clients should be audited by the same CPA
firm in both pre- and post-merger years so that the pre- and post-merger comparison is based on
the same client portfolios. This may introduce some selection bias if mergers affect the audit
firms’ selection of clients or clients’ choices over auditors. We therefore construct an alternative
sample without such a requirement. This sample includes all clients firms audited by the merging
CPA firms from years -3 to 0. The Logit regression results based on this alternative sample are
qualitative the same: the POST variable is significantly positive (Z = 2.602) for the MULTI
sample and remains to be insignificantly different from zero (Z = 0.613) for the SINGLE sample.

6.

Further analyses

6.1 The clustering of mergers in calendar time
Our design is to compare the audit reporting decision of the merging CPA firms between the preand the post-merger periods. If there is no systematical time-series change in Pdetect, α, and other
factors that affect auditor decision making, the change in audit quality can be attributed to the
audit firm mergers. However, a substantial number of observations have year 0 in 2000 (see Panel
A, Table 1). As the clustering in calendar time may not randomize the effects of these factors, it
could be that the changes we observe for our test sample is an artifact of a more general change
occurring across the board for all firms. To examine the potential confounding effect of time
period, we compare our experimental sample with a control sample over the same period.
Specifically, we match the CPA firms in our experimental sample (firms that merged) with
those that do not undergo mergers during our sample period by year. We require that between
experimental and control CPA firms, the absolute difference in total client assets audited at the
end of year -1 does not exceed 20%. By these criteria, we have 20 non-merger control CPA firms
matched with 20 pre-merger CPA firms in the MULTI group. The difference between the
experimental and the control CPA firms in total client assets audited at the end of year -1 is not
significant (t = -0.89). Similar to the sample selection criteria described in section 4, we selected
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748 client firm-years audited by the control CPA firms from year -3 to 0. These observations are
pooled with 680 client firm-years of the experimental sample and the following Logit model is
estimated:
MAO = α0 + α1EXP + β0POST + β1EXP×POST

(9)

+ γ1CURRENT + γ2ARINV + γ3LEV + γ4TURN + γ5ROA + γ6LOSS
+ γ7AGE + γ8EM + γ9RET + γ10STDR + γ11Ln(TAST) + ε,
where EXP equals to one if the observation is audited by the experimental CPA firms, and zero
otherwise, and other variables are defined as before. In this model, the coefficient on EXP
measures the pre-merger difference between the experimental and the control CPA firms in their
propensity to issue MAOs. The coefficient on POST estimates the general change in this
propensity across the experimental and the control CPA firms during the post-merger period. The
post-merger change in the issuance of MAOs specific to the experimental CPA firms is captured
by the interaction term EXP×POST.19
Column (1) of Table 5 reports the results for equation (9) for the MULTI group. The
coefficient on EXP is not significantly different from zero. Therefore, auditors in the experimental
CPA firms are similar to their peers in the control sample in issuing MAOs before mergers. The
coefficient on POST is not significant either. Thus, there is no evidence suggesting a general
change in issuing MAOs across the control and the experimental samples in the year 0. However,
the coefficient on EXP×POST is significantly positive (p<0.01). This suggests that, other things
being equal, auditors in our experimental sample are more likely to issue MAOs than auditors in
the non-merger control audit firms in the merger year (i.e., year 0). Additionally, the sum of POST
and EXP×POST is positive and significant at the 0.01 level, indicating post-merger propensity of
MAOs in the MULTI sample is higher than that before mergers. Therefore, our findings are not
time-period specific results.
[Insert Table 5 here]
By the same method, we create a control sample of 27 non-merger CPA firms for the
SINGLE group. The difference in total client assets audited at the end of year -1 between the
SINGLE group and the control sample is not significant (t = -1.24). The estimates of equation (9)
for the SINGLE group and its control sample are reported in Column (2) of Table 5. Auditors in
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the SINGLE group are not different from their matched peers in issuing MAOs before or after
mergers, as neither the EXP nor the EXP×POST variable is significantly different from zero.
Moreover, POST + EXP×POST is not significantly different from zero. We thus find no evidence
suggesting post-merger change in the propensity of issuing MAOs for the SINGLE group
auditors.
In the above analysis, we use total client assets audited by the audit firms as the matching
criterion. The results are not sensitive to the use of number of listed clients as an alternative audit
firm size measure. We also perform the analyses by partitioning the merger cases into two
sub-samples: those in 2000 and those in other years. Untabulated results indicate that, for the
MULTI type mergers, the variable of POST is significantly positive in both sub-samples. Again,
POST is not significant for the SINGLE type mergers in either sub-sample. Collectively, the
results do not indicate that the increase in the propensity of issuing MAOs is due to some
systematic factors that affect all auditors in year 2000. Recall that the absolute difference in listed
clientele between the merging CPA firms and their control firms cannot exceed 20% in matching.
This procedure reduces the sample size (for example, n is reduced from 1,047 in Table 4 to 680 in
Table 5 for the MULTI sample). Therefore, in subsequent analyses, we keep the original sample,
which should be more representative of the population.
6.2 Possible selection bias caused by audit firms’ merger decisions
Our investigation of the difference in audit quality before and after mergers for the same set of
clients avoids the selection bias caused by clients’ auditor choice. However, it could be that audit
firms choosing the MULTI type mergers are inherently different from those in the SINGLE group,
which leads to the different effects of mergers on audit quality. Although the descriptive statistics
in Table 1 reveal no systematic difference in major characteristics between the SINGLE and
MULTI groups, we adopt the matched propensity approach suggested by Francis and Lennox
(2008) to further address this issue. Specifically, we first estimate a Logit model to predict the
propensity for audit firms to choose the MULTI type mergers. For each MULTI type audit firm,
we identify a SINGLE type audit firm that has the closest predicted probability as match. Finally,
we estimate a regression to examine whether the MULTI firms are more likely to issue MAOs
after mergers than their matched SINGLE firms. This approach controls the possible selectivity
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by aligning the distribution of observed characteristics within the matched MULTI and SINGLE
samples.20
To predict the merger types chosen by the audit firms, we estimate the following Logit
model using pre-merger audit firms as unit of analysis:
MULTI = α + β1Legal + β2Beijing + β3Shanghai + β4BigN + β5∑Ln(TAST) + β6AGE

(10)

+ β7F_Score + υ,
where MULTI is equal to 1 if the merger type is a multi-license one, and 0 otherwise. We include
the following independent variables, all measured at the beginning of merger year, to predict the
types of audit firm mergers. Legal, Beijing, and Shanghai are three region-specific variables.
Legal is Fan and Wang’s (2004) legal environment index for the region where the merging audit
firm locates, with higher index meaning a better legal environment. As listed clients and CPA
firms serving such clients are more likely to cluster in a legally mature environment, audit firms
are more likely to consummate the MULTI-type mergers in regions with higher Legal index. We
note that there are relatively more merging firms located in Beijing and Shanghai, the two most
important metropolitans in China. Two dummy variables, Beijing and Shanghai, for audit firm
located in these two cities are included to examine whether Beijing and Shanghai audit firms
differ from others in their merger decisions. We then include several audit firm characteristics
variables. BigN is a dummy indicating the observations is one of the Big N firms. To protect
themselves on audit risks, Big N are more likely to choose quality partners. Given their power,
they are also more likely to attract quality firms to merge with them. If the average quality of
licensed audit firms is higher, Big N firms are more likely to be in the MULTI group. ∑Ln(TAST)
is the sum of logged clients’ total assets and Age is the number of years the audit firm performs
audit services to listed companies. Large, mature firms could have their own practice philosophy
and may not find other compatible licensed firms to merge with. F_Score is the mean value of
clients’ first factor score from the factor analysis of the variables that may affect audit reports (i.e.,
the variables in Table 3), with higher score representing better financial position. It is more
difficult for firms with risky client portfolios to merge with other licensed firms since the high
audit risk of such clients could jeopardize the career of the incoming partners.
Panel A of Table 6 presents the prediction model results. The results reveal that audit firms
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operating in better legal environment are more likely to choose the MULTI type mergers. The
coefficient on Beijing is significantly negative at the 5% level, while that on Shanghai is not
significant.21 The coefficient signs of the audit firm characteristics variables are all consistent
with our conjecture with the exception of the Age variable.22
[Insert Table 6 here]
Following Francis and Lennox (2008), we sort the sample audit firms by the estimated
probability obtained from the prediction model and implement the following rules to match the
MULTI audit firms with the SINGLE ones: (1) if only one of the two firms adjacent to a MULTI
audit firm is a SINGLE audit firm, it is chosen as the match; (2) if both adjacent firms belong to
the SINGLE group, we choose the one with closest estimated probability; and (3) if there is no
SINGLE audit firm adjacent to a MULTI audit firm, it is dropped. We are able to identify 27 pairs
of audit firms. With the paired difference between two groups in the estimated probability being
lower than 0.01%, the probability distribution of the MULTI audit firms is close enough to their
SINGLE matches to mitigate the selectivity. To examine whether the post-merger change in the
propensity to issue MAOs differs between the two groups, we pool the client firm-years audited
by the MULTI and the matched SINGLE samples and estimate the following model:
MAO = α0 + α1SINGLE + β0POST + β1SINGLE×POST

(11)

+ γ1CURRENT + γ2ARINV + γ3LEV + γ4TURN + γ5ROA + γ6LOSS
+ γ7AGE + γ8EM + γ9RET + γ10STDR + γ11Ln(TAST) + ε,
where SINGLE is a dummy variable indicating that the audit firm selects SINGLE type merger,
and all other independent variables are defined as before. In this model, the coefficient on
SINGLE captures the difference between the SINGLE and the MULTI groups in their propensity
to issue MAOs before mergers. Post-merger change in the likelihood of MAOs in the MULTI
group is reflected in the POST coefficient, and such a change for the SINGLE group is measured
by the sum of coefficients on POST and SINGLE×POST.
Model (11) results are reported in Panel B of Table 6. After correcting the selection bias, the
conclusion is qualitative the same as before: the significantly positive coefficient on POST
indicates that the MUTLI group issues more MAOs after mergers; SINGLE×POST is
significantly negative (p<0.10) and the sum of coefficients on POST and SINGLE×POST is not
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significantly different from zero in the χ2 statistics, which means that there is no significant
post-merger change in the propensity for MAOs in the matched SINGLE group. Therefore, it
does not appear that there is any selection bias that affects our results.
Using the full sample, we also apply the Heckman method by including the inverse Mills
ratio estimated from the choice model [i.e., model (10)] in model (11). The results are qualitative
the same as those in Table 6. Also, the multicollinearity problem is not a concern as the VIF
statistics in model (11) are all below 4.
6.3 Alternative explanations
In the prior section, we show that auditors in the MULTI group are more likely to issue MAOs
after mergers, while those in the SINGLE group are not. Given the different impacts of the two
types of mergers on CPA firms’ listed clients and thus quasi rents at stake, the evidence lends
support to the theory that auditor independence is positively related to quasi rents at stake. From
the auditor expertise literature, mergers should have little immediate effect on auditor competence.
Moreover, if competence does change immediately, both the SINGLE and MULTI groups should
show post-merger improvement in audit quality.23 We further analyze the competence issue in the
following.
Some cases in the MULTI group involve Big Ns’ member firms in China. If the Big N
auditors are more competent due to better training, auditors in the non-Big N firms could be more
competent after they merger with Big N.24 To verify whether mergers with Big N firms are
driving the results for the MULTI sample, we exclude two cases involving Big N (AA and DTT)
from the sample. Column (1) of Table 7 reports the results without these cases. The results are
qualitatively the same as those reported before.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Since we argue that improvement in audit quality in year 0 is primarily due to changes in
independence rather than competence after mergers, it is interesting to examine whether different
pre-merger audit firms jointly audit the same client after mergers. Intuitively, joint audits could
allow auditors to share their expertise and thus improve the overall competence of the merged
firms. In China, audit reports for listed companies should be signed by at least two individual
CPAs who perform audits for the clients. If there is any joint audit in year 0, then the audit reports
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should be signed by CPAs from different pre-merger audit firms. We examine the audit reports
and find 21 such joint audit cases out of 293 observations in year 0 in the MULTI sample.
Column (2) of Table 7 reports the results based on the sample excluding pre- and post-merger
observations that belonged to client firms jointly audited by different pre-merger audit firms in
year 0. The tenor of our results is not changed after excluding these observations. Therefore, the
potential improvement in competence immediately after mergers does not explain the post-merger
improvement in audit quality.
Another possibility that may confound the significant audit quality improvement after
merger in the MULTI group is that independence may improve through channels other than the
size of quasi rents at stake. Chan et al. (2006) and Wang et al. (2008) find that Chinese auditor
locality affects their reporting decision. Due to the political influence of local governments,
auditors report more favorably when the auditors and client firms are located in the same regions
(province or equivalent in China), as compared to the non-local clients. Mergers between CPA
firms may change the relative locality of clients. For example, a Beijing firm merges with a
Shanghai firm and administers audits of clients that are previously audited by the Shanghai firm.
In such cases, the merged firm could be more independent since the Shanghai government is less
able to intervene in the audits performed by the Beijing auditors. It is thus possible that
independence improvement is caused by a change in locality rather than quasi rents at stake. To
alleviate this concern, we split the sample into two sub-samples: one for mergers within the same
region, and the other for mergers across different regions. The results for these two sub-samples
for the MULTI group are reported in Columns (3) and (4), respectively, of Table 7. The POST
variable takes a significantly positive coefficient in both sub-samples. Hence, the possible
impacts of the locality change caused by mergers do not fully explain our findings.25
6.4 The magnitude of mergers’ impacts and post-merger audit quality improvement
The previous analysis suggests that MULTI type mergers have a more significant impact on
post-merger audits than the SINGLE type. This supports DeAngelo’s (1981) theory since the
former leads to a larger increase in quasi rents at stake than the latter. In this section, we
investigate whether the change in audit quality after the MULTI mergers varies with the
magnitude of mergers’ impact on audit firm’s quasi rents at stake. Such evidence would lend
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further support to the quasi rent theory. The following two hypothetical cases illustrate how the
impact of mergers can differ across firms.
Case I: The pre-merger firm A has 5 listed clients and the pre-merger firm B has 15 listed
clients. The post-merger firm, AB, has 20 clients.
Case II: The pre-merger firms A* and B* have 10 listed clients each. The post-merger firm,
A*B*, has 20 clients.
Although all firms experience an increase in clients after mergers, the impacts are quite
different: in Case I, the increase in the number of listed clients is 15 and 5, for A and B,
respectively, while the increase is 10 for both A* and B* in Case II. Accordingly, the strength of
the post-merger change in audit quality is the greatest for A, followed by A*/B*, and B. To capture
the strength of the merger, we define the relative size of an audit firm in a merger as:
RELSIZEi =

Sizei, -1
n

∑ Size
i =1

,

(12)

i , -1

n

where Sizei, -1 is the size of listed clientele for audit firm i at the end of year -1, and

∑ Size
i =1

i , -1

is

the sum of listed clientele for n audit firms participating in a merger.26 Since a larger value in
RELSIZEi means a relatively smaller change in audit firm size after mergers for audit firm i, we
predict a negative relation between the post-merger change in audit quality and RELSIZEi. An
interaction term, POST×RELSIZE, is added to the regression model to test this prediction.
We use the continuous form of RELSIZE as well as its tercile ranks (from 0 to 2 and then
divided by 2), which is less subject to the outlier problem and the linearity assumption. The
results are reported in Panel A of Table 8, where Columns (1) and (2) are based on continuous and
rank specifications, respectively. In both columns, POST is significantly positive and
POST×RELSIZE is significantly negative. Therefore, the post-merger increase in the probability
of MAOs decreases with RELSIZE, i.e., the larger the audit firm before the mergers, the smaller
will be the post-merger improvement in audit quality. To determine the economic significance, we
set all the variables at sample mean and POST at 1, and then change the value of RELSIZE. For
the continuous specification, when RELSIZE is at its first quartile (0.364), the post-merger
probability of issuing MAOs is 15.02%; and when setting RELSIZE at the third quartile (0.660),
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this probability decreases to 9.60%. Similarly, for the rank specification, moving from the
bottom- to middle- and then to top-tercile of RELSIZE (i.e., the variable is changed from 0, to 0.5,
and 1) is associated with a decrease in this probability from 17.99%, to 13.27%, and to 9.64%.
Given that the base probability of MAOs is 8.48% before merger (see Section 5.2), the RELSIZE
variable does cause economically significant variation in the post-merger MAO probability
change.
In Panel B of Table 8, we use total listed clientele assets audited by the firm as an alternative
size measure. The results are even stronger in statistical sense and our conclusion remains the
same. Taken together, the results in Table 8 suggest that in the MULIT group the change depends
on the magnitude of the change in firm size due to mergers. This finding provides additional
support to the DeAngelo (1980) theory.
[Insert Table 8 here]

7.

Summary and conclusion

Studies on audit quality typically compare the difference between Big N and non-Big N and find
that the audit quality of Big N is higher than that of non-Big N. However, DeAngelo’s (1981)
proposition that large auditors are more independent due to more aggregate quasi rents serving as
collateral against malfeasance is subject to alternative explanations, including the difference in
auditors’ competence between large and small auditors, the incentives for Big N to protect their
brand names, and the potential self-selection problem in the data. By examining the difference in
audit quality between the pre- and the post-merger audit firms in China, we have a better control
for these confounding effects. We hypothesize that auditors are more independent subsequent to
mergers only when mergers increase their quasi rents at stake. Since the SINGLE mergers (where
a licensed CPA firm merges with non-licensed ones) have little impact on auditors’ aggregate
quasi rents at stake, we argue that the improvement of independence should be more evident in
MULTI mergers (involving at least two CPA firms licensed to audit listed companies).
Consistent with the above argument, we find that audit firms involved in MULTI mergers
are more likely to issue MAOs to clients after mergers. Also, the increased propensity for MAOs
is significantly related to change in audit firm size after mergers. In contrast, there is no evidence
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suggesting any significant change in the issuance of MAOs for audit firms involved in SINGLE
mergers. Given that the two groups of CPA firms are comparable prior to mergers and similar in
size (in terms of annual total revenues) after mergers, the different effects of mergers on audit
quality support the theory that auditor independence is a positive function of aggregate quasi
rents at stake.
While the wave of CPA firm mergers in China was at least partly orchestrated by the
government, more than half of the mergers (i.e., the SINGLE group) do not result in any apparent
improvement in audit quality. One policy implication is that simply increasing audit firm size per
se (e.g., increase the number of auditors or audit firm revenues, as the new regulations stipulated)
does not enhance auditors’ independence. The level of independence and thus audit quality is
determined by auditors’ trade-off between the costs and benefits of opportunistic behavior.
Although we show that there is a significant change in auditor independence for the multi-license
type of mergers, the evidence does not necessarily imply that the overall post-merger audit
quality in China has reached a socially optimal level in protecting investors. Experience from
mature markets suggests that, in addition to public enforcement by regulators, other mechanisms
such as private litigation against auditors, the market demand for auditor reputation and improved
disclosures on audit services should be helpful in a well-functioning audit market. These
mechanisms, however, are not yet very effective in China’s audit market. To further foster auditor
independence, it should be useful for Chinese regulators to consider these additional mechanisms
as well as other social costs involved.
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Endnotes
1

Some researchers have noticed this issue (cf. Deis and Giroux 1992, 464; Jeter and Shaw 1995, 314).

2

For example, contrary to the theory that risky firms would select high quality auditors to maximize firm value

when going public (Datar, Feltham, and Hughes 1991), Feltham, Hughes, and Simunic (1991) report that U.S.
IPO clients of the Big N are less risky than those of the non-Big N. They conjecture that this might be due to
self-selection since U.S. Big N tend to avoid risky clients and the potential litigation losses. This conjecture is
confirmed by Clarkson and Simunic (1994) using data from Canada, where the auditor litigation costs are lower
and the self-selection problem is less serious.
3

We define risk to auditors as the probability of auditor’s opportunistic behavior being detected. Moreover, the

detection affects the utility of the auditors negatively (e.g., law suits, regulatory sanctions, and the loss of market
share due to tarnished reputation).
4

As early as 1988, the Big 8 already audited 96.6% and 84.5% of the firms listed in NYSE and AMEX,

respectively (Wootton, Tonge, and Wolk, 1994). At the end of 1999, the market share of Big Ns’ member firms
in China is only about 3.6% (11.9%) in terms of the number of listed clients (listed clients’ total assets). This
figure grows to 6.93% (41.39%) by the end of 2006.
5

In the 1990s, international accounting firms had only indirect involvement in China’s audit market. For

example, they can joint-venture with domestic CPA firms. They can also invest in domestic firms since 1999.
China grants Sino-foreign joint ventures, including the international accounting firms, a period of up to five
years of income tax exemptions and reductions.
6

The supply of qualified CPAs in China is not likely to increase significantly in the short term since the pass

rate for professional examinations for audits of listed companies has been quite low. In 2001, 11,307 CPAs took
the examination and only 150 passed.
7

The analysis can be extended to mergers involving more than two audit firms without loss of generality. While

we only analyze the situation where client c is audited by A before merger, the result can also apply to a client
originally audited by B.
8

Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) report that post-merger improvement in productivity is particularly strong

for firms with highly overlapping businesses. Researchers also find that increase in profitability after mergers is
associated with lower costs of goods sold in industrial firms (Fee and Thomas 2004) or reduced operating
expenses in banking service businesses (Houston, James, and Ryngaert 2001).
9

Merger could also affect quasi rents in that clients may switch audit firms after merger if merger results in the

client’s competitor being served by the same audit firm and thus the possible leakage of proprietary information
to the competitor. However, a GAO survey suggests that 92% of large U.S. public companies still choose an
audit firm when the firm also audits their competitors (Krishnan 2005). Similarly, for our sample firms, the
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market share per audit firm measured by total client assets audited stays basically unchanged immediately after
mergers.
10

There are also mergers where the mergees are all non-licensed CPA firms. As the clients of such non-licensed

firms are not listed, data for this type of merger are not publicly available.
11

The clustering of mergers in calendar time is consistent with Harford’s (2005) theory that merger activities

are firms’ rational response to the new environment, such as economic, regulatory, and technological shocks.
12

Ideally, the comparison should be between 1999 and 2000. However, to the best of our knowledge, data for

years 2000 and 2001 are not publicly available.
13

Analysis based on median values and Wilcoxon rank sum tests for Panels B, C and D in Table 1 shows a

pattern similar to that based on mean values.
14

Chen, Su, and Zhao (2000) report that the related monetary amounts in some cases of unqualified opinion

with explanatory notes were much larger than the adjustment amounts in some qualified audit reports. The
CSRC also treats unqualified opinion with explanatory notes opinion the same as qualified opinion in disclosure
requirements.
15

Using data from 1995 to 1997, Chen et al. (2001) report that a similar reason for MAOs is firms’ earnings

management to meet the profitability requirement specified by CSRC in 1996 for rights offerings. We attempted
to include a dummy variable defined in a way that reflects the rule for rights offerings. However, it is not
significant. This is probably because the rights offerings rule subsequently enacted in 1999 has lowered such
earnings management incentives for Chinese firms (Haw, Qi, Wu, and Wu 2005).
16

We estimate the market model by regressing individual stock returns on market return, using weekly stock

return data during the fiscal year.
17

The results are similar for the median values and Wilcoxon tests.

18

In Section 6, we match the merger audit firms with non-merger ones by audit firm size and time, and examine

whether the post-merger change in audit reporting is specific to the merger firms. Since the merger sample and
their matches are drawn from the same time period, the results from the match design are even less likely to be
affected by the correlated-but-omitted variable problem.
19

Note that some variables are significantly different between the pre- and post-merger periods in Table 3.

Untabulated analysis suggests that the differences in these variables between the experimental and their controls
are not significant in either the pre- or the post-merger periods, except that the experimental clients of the
SINGLE group have higher leverage than their controls in both the pre- and the post-merger periods. This will
not create any problem since we are comparing audit in the pre-merger period with that of the post-merger
period and since we have a control variable for leverage when comparing the experimental clients with their
controls.
20

Compared with the traditional Heckman (1979) method, the matched propensity method has the following
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merits: (1) it relaxes the “exclusion restrictions” requirement (i.e., some independent variables in the first-stage
choice model should be truly exogenous and excluded from the second-stage analysis), which is often
overlooked by researchers; (2) it is not subject to the multicollinearity problem due to the inclusion of inverse
Mills ratio in the second-stage analysis; and (3) empirical results are not sensitive to the model specifications in
the first- or the second-stage and are thus more robust (Francis and Lennox 2008).
21

Beijing has the highest per capita accountants in China (Fan and Wang 2004). And all main accounting

regulatory agencies, the CSRC, MOF, and CICPA, are in Beijing. It may be particularly attractive for a
non-Beijing licensed audit firm to merge with a Beijing non-licensed firm when entering the Beijing market to
facilitate its development. This increases the likelihood of SINGLE mergers occurring in Beijing.
22

In model (10), we also consider other variables proxy for regional development, such as government

intervention, credit market development, or the overall marketization. These variables are not significant. We
also consider alternative audit firm size measures, such as the number of listed clients, the number of CPAs who
sign on the audit reports, or various market share variables (i.e., the size variables deflated by the total market
size). Results based on these alternative measures are similar to those reported.
23

Note that licensed CPA firms in the SINGLE group merge with non-licensed ones. If the expertise of

non-licensed CPAs tends to differ from and thus complement that of licensed CPAs, auditors in the SINGLE
mergers are more likely to improve their competence. However, we find no such evidence.
24

Alternatively, Big N firms have stronger incentives to promote independence of the non-Big N firm merged

with them in order to protect their internationally established brand names.
25

In the SINGLE sample, there is one case involving a Big N firm (EY). Excluding this case does not change

the insignificant result for the POST variable. For this type of mergers, we cannot identify joint audits by
different pre-merger audit firms in year 0 since the identities of auditors from non-license CPA firms are not
publicly available in the pre-merger years. We also partition the SINGLE group into two sub-samples by the
locality of merging audit firms. In neither sub-sample can we find more frequent MAOs after mergers.
26

Hence, in Case I, RELSIZEi is 25% and 75% for A and B, respectively, and equals to 50% for both A* and B*

in Case II. For our sample, n = 2 in most cases.
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Appendix
Difference in audit fees between the pre- and the post-merger years
Prior research on the effect of mergers on audit pricing provides mixed evidence. Iyer and Iyer
(1996) and Ivancevich and Zardkoohi (2000) do not find significant change in audit fees after
mergers in the U.K. or U.S. audit markets. However, Firth and Lau (2004) and Lee (2005)
document that audit fees increase after mergers in the Hong Kong market. In this appendix, we
examine whether audit prices change around mergers for our sample firms.
Chinese listed firms have been required to disclose audit fees since 2001. As some firms also
voluntarily disclose audit fees in the prior year, audit fee data are available for year 2000 onwards.
For the 145 client firms whose auditor experience mergers between 2001 and 2006, 118 firms
have complete audit fee data in both year -1 (pre-merger) and year 0 (post-merger). Following
previous audit pricing research (e.g., Simunic, 1980), we regress the natural logarithm of audit
fees on the following variables:
POST

= 1, if the observation is from year 0, and 0 otherwise;

Ln(TAST)

= The natural logarithm of total assets audited;

NSUB½

= Square root of the number of consolidated subsidiaries;

ARINV

= The intensiveness of accounts receivables and inventory (sum of total
receivables and inventory divided by total assets);

ROA

= Return on assets (earnings divided by total assets);

CURRENT = Current ratio (current assets divided by current liabilities); and
LEV

= Leverage ratio (liabilities divided by total assets).

The regression results are as follows:
Ln(Fee) = 4.910‡ + 0.002×POST + 0.357‡×Ln(TAST) + 0.143‡×NSUB½ + 0.185×ARINV
+ 0.774†×ROA + 0.039×CURRENT + 0.193×LEV + ε.
R2 = 51.4%, N = 236, F-value = 36.53‡
(† and ‡ denote two-tailed significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.)
In the above regression, the coefficient on POST is 0.002 (t = 0.04). This suggests that,
ceteris paribus, audit fees after mergers increase by 0.2% (= e0.002 – 1). Such an increase is not
statistically or economically significant. At least, the evidence does not support the view that
auditors cut audit fees after mergers.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics for CPA firm mergers in China
Panel A: The distribution of mergers
Type of mergers

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Total

MULTI

2

18

0

0

0

0

1

0

21

SINGLE

3

27

1

1

1

0

2

3

38

Panel B: The mean number of CPA firms involved in mergers
Types of firms

MULTI group

SINGLE group

t-statistics

Licensed firms

2.18

1.00

11.06***

Non-licensed firms

0.45

1.97

-3.85***

Total

2.64

3.00

-0.93

Panel C: Characteristics of listed clientele before and after mergers
Characteristics

MULTI group

SINGLE group

t-statistics

8.91

10.43

-0.87

17.36

17.77

-0.08

6.84

8.15

-1.23

Mean number of listed clients

16.41

10.43

2.53**

Mean total assets audited (in billions yuan)

36.87

20.95

1.83*

Mean number of auditors signing audit reports

13.43

8.86

Pre-merger (per firm before merger)
Mean number of listed clients
Mean total assets audited (in billions yuan)
Mean number of auditors signing audit reports
Post-merger (per merged firm after merger)

3.43***

Panel D: Growth in total annual revenues of CPA firms
Mean annual revenues (in millions yuan)

MULTI group

SINGLE group

t-statistics

Fiscal year 1999

13.15

11.91

0.26

Fiscal year 2002

29.60

31.94

-0.59

MULTI refers to multi-license mergers, where there are at least two constituent licensed CPA firms. SINGLE
refers to single-license mergers, where there is only one licensed CPA firm involved in the mergers. The
licensed firms are CPA firms that have a license to audit listed companies in China.
In Panel C, the pre-merger data are computed by the CPA firms’ listed clients in the most recent year before
mergers and post-merger data are computed by merged CPA firms’ listed clients at the end of the merger year.
Clients newly acquired in the merger year are not included in the post-merger data to improve the
comparability of pre- and post-merger data on client characteristics.
In Panel D, the revenues of CPA firms are the total annual revenues, including those earned from listed clients
and non-listed clients.
The t-statistics are from t-tests comparing the difference in mean values between the multi- and single-license
sample firms.
* **

, , and *** denote two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
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TABLE 2
Univariate analysis of auditors’ reporting decisions
Panel A: MULTI group
Pre-merger

Post-merger

(Year -3, -2, and -1)

(Year 0)

Row total

Clean reports

86.34%

(651)

79.18%

(232)

84.34%

(883)

MAOs

13.66%

(103)

20.82%

(61)

15.66%

(164)

100.00%

(754)

100.00%

(293)

100.00%

(1,047)

Column total

χ2 = 8.185***
Panel B: SINGLE group
Pre-merger

Post-merger

(Year -3, -2, and -1)

(Year 0)

Row total

Clean reports

85.42%

(797)

82.34%

(303)

84.55%

(1,100)

MAOs

14.58%

(136)

17.66%

(65)

15.45%

(201)

100.00%

(933)

100.00%

(368)

100.00%

(1,301)

Column total

χ2 =1.925
MAOs include unqualified opinions with explanatory notes, qualified, disclaimed, and adverse opinions.
Figures in parentheses are actual cell frequencies (i.e., number of clean reports, number of MAOs, etc.).
***

Significant at the 0.01 level.
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TABLE 3
Mean value for independent variables used in multivariate Logit analysis
Panel A: MULTI group (n = 754 for Pre-merger period; n = 293 for Post-merger period)
Raw value
Variables

Scaled percentile ranks

Pre-merger Post-merger t-Statistics

CURRENT

1.956

1.730

2.56

ARINV

0.376

0.358

1.36

**

***

Pre-merger Post-merger

t-Statistics

0.513

0.483

1.51

0.499

0.508

-0.45

LEV

0.443

0.476

-2.62

0.493

0.522

-1.42

TURN

0.530

0.520

0.43

0.512

0.509

0.13

0.517

0.510

0.36

ROA

0.050

0.035

3.46

LOSS

0.070

0.092

-1.19

***

***

AGE

3.292

4.877

-10.36

EM

0.042

0.058

-1.07

RET

-0.008

0.015

-0.89

STDR
Ln(TAST)

0.046
20.754

0.048
21.025

-

0.524
-

0.587

-3.26***

-

-

0.505

0.513

-0.38

*

0.493

0.515

-1.11

***

0.539

0.548

-0.45

-1.86
-4.51

Panel B: SINGLE group (n = 933 for Pre-merger period; n = 368 for Post-merger period)
Raw value
Variables

Scaled percentile ranks

Pre-merger Post-merger t-Statistics

CURRENT

1.849

1.645

2.61

ARINV

0.358

0.348

0.87

***

***

Pre-merger Post-merger

t-Statistics

0.507

0.483

1.39

0.497

0.522

-1.43

LEV

0.464

0.499

-2.83

0.497

0.519

-1.24

TURN

0.526

0.505

0.85

0.496

0.484

0.65

0.520

0.480

2.29**

ROA

0.037

0.022

3.29

LOSS

0.097

0.120

-1.23

***

***

AGE

3.905

5.438

-8.85

EM

0.047

0.063

-1.13

RET
STDR
Ln(TAST)

0.485
-

*

0.547
-

-3.63***
-

-0.026

0.006

-1.74

0.482

0.515

-1.89*

0.043

0.046

-3.82***

0.475

0.512

-2.17**

20.796

20.994

-3.61***

0.507

0.505

0.11

The table presents the mean of the raw values and the scaled percentile ranks for the control variables used in
the regression analysis. The continuous variables are transformed into percentile ranks and the ranks (from 0
to 99) are scaled by 99. The ranking is based on the population in the CSMAR database by year.
CURRENT is current ratio (current assets divided by current liabilities); ARINV is accounts receivables and
inventory intensiveness (sum of accounts receivables and inventory divided by total assets); LEV is leverage
ratio (liabilities divided by total assets); TURN is turnover ratio (total sales divided by total assets); ROA is
return on assets (earnings divided by total assets); LOSS is equal to 1 if client firm has reported a loss, and 0
otherwise; AGE is the number of years a company has been listed; EM is equal to 1 if client firm has reported
a ROE between 0 and 1%, and 0 otherwise; RET is annual market adjusted stock returns; STDR is the
standard deviation of residuals from the market model estimated by weekly return data during the year;
Ln(TAST) is the natural logarithm of clients’ total assets.
* **
, , and *** denote the post-merger observations are different from the per-merger ones in the t-test at the
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
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TABLE 4
Multivariate Logit analysis of auditors’ reporting decisions

Independent variables
Intercept

(1)

(2)

MULTI group (n = 1,047)

SINGLE group (n = 1,301)

Coefficients

Z-Statistics

-2.148

POST
CURRENT

-0.304

Z-Statistics

-3.077

3.011***

0.109

0.672

0.481

0.755

-2.652

0.538

Coefficients

***

-0.462

ARINV

0.825

1.648

1.031

2.024**

LEV

0.513

0.685

1.470

2.209**

TURN

-0.596

-1.288

-1.821

-4.560***

ROA

-2.281

-3.356***

-1.332

-2.261**

LOSS

0.544

1.556

1.145

3.560***

AGE

0.512

1.093

0.495

1.093

EM

0.534

1.430

RET

-0.757

STDR

0.063

0.176

***

-0.235

-0.725

***

3.558

1.433

-0.041

-0.247

-2.212

1.566

Ln(TAST)
Wald χ

*

-4.198***

2

-0.019

***

Pseudo R

-0.594
***

153.534
2

3.637***
205.839

18.15%

20.42%

The estimates are based on the Logit method. The dependent variable is MAO, which is equal to 1 if client
firm receives a modified opinion and 0 otherwise. POST is a dummy variable indicating that the observations
are from the post-merger period. All other independent variables are defined as in Table 3. The continuous
variables have been transformed into cross-sectional percentile ranks and the ranks (from 0 to 99) are scaled
by 99. The Z-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by client firms.
* **
, , and *** denote two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
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TABLE 5
Auditors’ reporting decisions for the experimental and control sample firms

Independent variables
Intercept

(1) MULTI group

(2) SINGLE group

(n = 1,428, including 680

(n = 2,158, including 1,180

experimental and 748 control firms)

experimental and 978 control firms)

Coefficients

Z-Statistics
***

Coefficients

Z-Statistics
-4.319***

-1.937

-2.823

-2.669

EXP

0.139

0.573

0.063

0.315

POST

-0.391

-1.590

-0.111

-0.528

***

EXP×POST

1.061

3.277

0.246

0.959

CURRENT

-0.465

-0.809

0.411

0.783

ARINV

0.616

1.349

0.813

2.034**

LEV

0.307

0.472

1.620

2.878***

TURN

-1.326

-3.038***

-1.394

-4.505***

ROA

-1.668

-2.677***

-1.494

-2.928***

LOSS

0.772

2.472**

1.121

4.237***

AGE

0.848

1.983**

0.672

1.741*

EM

0.609

1.843*

0.336

1.110

RET

-0.334

-0.033

-0.132

STDR

***

3.497

0.621

-0.611

-0.739

1.205

Ln(TAST)
2

χ for POST+EXP×POST
Wald χ

-1.218

2

Pseudo R2

-0.261

2.122**
-2.015

***

0.459

***

326.961***

7.372

188.575

16.17%

18.70%

The estimates are based on the Logit method. The dependent variable is MAO, a dummy variable indicating
that client firm receives a modified opinion. The independent variables are defined as in Table 3. The
Z-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by client firms.
The sample CPA firms are matched with those that do not merge during our sample period, by year and by
total client assets audited at the end of year -1. The dummy variable EXP equals to one if the observation is
audited by the experimental CPA firms, and zero otherwise. There are 680 and 748 client observations in the
MULTI merger sample and its matched non-merger sample, respectively. For the SINGLE group, the number
of observations for the merger and the matched non-merger sample is 1,180 and 978, respectively.
* **

, , and *** denote two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
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TABLE 6
Analysis of selection bias caused by audit firms’ merger decisions
Panel A: Analysis of audit firm merger

Panel B: Analysis of auditors’ reporting decisions based

decisions (n = 81)

on a propensity-matched sample (n = 1,229)

Variables
Intercept
Legal

Coefficients
-2.197

Asy. t-stat.
-1.333
1.830*

0.512

**

Variables
SINGLE

0.241

0.941

0.646

2.846***

-2.461

POST

Shanghai

-0.262

-0.208

SINGLE×POST

1.411

1.065

-0.003

-1.638

0.028

0.190

-0.908

-1.564

Age
F_Score

-4.061***

-3.349

-2.584

∑Ln(TAST)

Z-Statistics

Intercept

Beijing
BigN

Coefficients

-0.514

-1.702*

CURRENT

0.306

0.456

ARINV

0.641

1.357

LEV

1.512

2.147**

TURN

-0.871

-1.955*

Wald χ2

15.28**

ROA

-1.784

-2.704***

Pseudo R2

17.20%

LOSS

0.677

1.966**

AGE

0.831

1.771*

EM

0.262

0.764

RET

-1.085

-3.220***

1.964

4.768***

STDR
Ln(TAST)

-0.192

2

χ for

-0.421
0.184

POST+SINGLE×POST
Wald χ2
Pseudo R2

184.77***
19.63%

The estimates are based on the Logit method.
In Panel A, the sample includes 81 pre-merger audit firms. The dependent variable is MULTI, which is equal
to 1 if the merger type is a multi-license one and 0 otherwise. Legal is the legal environment index from Fan
and Wang (2004); Beijing is equal to 1 if the audit firm is located in Beijing and 0 otherwise; Shanghai is
equal to 1 if the audit firm is located in Shanghai and 0 otherwise; BigN is equal to 1 for Big N audit firms
and 0 otherwise; ∑Ln(TAST) is the logged total assets audited; Age is the number of years the audit firm
perform audit services to listed companies; F_Score is the mean value of clients’ first factor score for the
variables that may affect audit reports (i.e., the variables in Table 3). The independent variables are measured
at the beginning of the merger year.
In Panel B, the sample consists of client-firm years for 27 MULTI audit firms and their SINGLE matches.
The match is based on the propensity to select MULTI type mergers estimated in Panel A. The dependent
variable is MAO, which is equal to 1 if client firm receives a modified opinion and 0 otherwise. POST is a
dummy variable indicating that the observations are from the post-merger period; SINGLE is a dummy
variable indicating that the audit firm selects SINGLE type merger; and all other independent variables are
defined as in Table 3. The continuous variables have been transformed into cross-sectional percentile ranks
and the ranks (from 0 to 99) are scaled by 99. The Z-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by
client firms.
* **

, , and *** denote two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
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TABLE 7
Tests of the alternative explanations for the MULTI group
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Excluding mergers involving Big N

Excluding joint audit observations

Mergers within the same region

Mergers across different regions

(n = 934)

(n = 963)

(n = 524)

(n = 523)

Independent
variables
Intercept

Coefficients

Z-Statistics
***

-2.401

POST

-2.820

2.703***

0.502

CURRENT

-0.212

-0.307

Coefficients

Z-Statistics
**

-1.946

-2.285

3.074***

0.556
-0.691

-1.007
*

Coefficients

Z-Statistics

-1.735

-1.506
2.334**

0.572

Coefficients

Z-Statistics

-2.553

-2.090**

0.603

2.251**

-0.361

-0.400

0.590

0.571

ARINV

0.687

1.373

0.959

1.821

0.662

1.073

0.276

0.308

LEV

0.638

0.821

0.116

0.148

1.198

1.123

0.299

0.253

-0.562

-1.173

-0.475

-0.996

-0.692

-1.187

TURN

***

***

-0.663

-0.915

*

-3.697

-3.758***

ROA

-2.148

-3.058

-2.282

-3.171

-1.641

LOSS

0.495

1.394

0.554

1.548

1.018

1.920*

-0.094

-0.185

AGE

0.696

1.437

0.588

1.226

0.107

0.167

EM

0.567

RET

*

-0.655

STDR

-1.843

***

1.503

Ln(TAST)
Wald χ

1.463

2

0.125
136.300

Pseudo R

17.72%

1.425
*

-0.683

3.262

1.505

0.262

0.079

***

2

0.553

-1.936

***

1.223
1.779

0.172

-0.973

-0.101

-0.153

*

-0.266

-0.580

***

154.508

18.95%

0.846

-1.697

2.953

1.267

-1.522

1.022

***

147.143

0.600

**

2.547

-0.862

3.331
***

-1.669

24.75%

1.783*
1.507
50.130

***

12.34%

The estimates are based on the Logit method. The dependent variable is MAO, a dummy variable indicating that client firm receives a modified opinion. The independent
variables are defined as in Table 3. The Z-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by client firms.
In column (1), we report results based on a sample excluding merger cases involving Big N firms. In column (2), we drop observations belonged to client firms that were
jointly audited by different pre-merger audit firms in year 0. In columns (3) and (4), we estimate the regression for merger cases within and across regions (province or
equivalent in China) separately.
* **

, , and *** denote two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
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TABLE 8
The magnitude of mergers’ impacts and post-merger audit quality improvement
Panel A: Measuring size by the number of listed clients
Independent
variables
Intercept

(1) Continuous specification
Coefficients
-2.244

POST

Z-Statistics

1.275

(2) Rank specification
Coefficients

***

-2.218

3.413***

0.860

-2.703

Panel B: Measuring size by the total listed clientele assets
(1) Continuous specification

Z-Statistics

Coefficients

***

-2.245

3.730***

1.279

-2.676

Z-Statistics

(2) Rank specification
Coefficients

Z-Statistics

***

-2.296

-2.732***

3.420***

1.032

4.165***

-2.702

POST×RELSIZE

-1.723

-2.066**

-0.721

-1.839*

-1.735

-2.076**

-1.085

-2.472**

CURRENT

-0.250

-0.379

-0.257

-0.388

-0.249

-0.377

-0.237

-0.357

ARINV

0.804

1.612

0.797

1.596

0.805

1.612

0.801

1.601

LEV

0.571

0.753

0.557

0.735

0.572

0.753

0.561

0.737

-0.576

-1.240

-0.587

-1.257

-0.576

-1.241

-0.580

-1.243
-3.292***

TURN

***

***

***

ROA

-2.256

-3.337

-2.246

-3.301

-2.256

-3.339

-2.216

LOSS

0.531

1.539

0.533

1.539

0.531

1.538

0.531

1.536

AGE

0.488

1.035

0.479

1.014

0.488

1.035

0.506

1.069

EM

0.541

1.427

0.549

1.449

0.542

1.428

0.538

1.427

-0.809

-2.342**

RET

-0.800

STDR

-2.326

1.660

Ln(TAST)
Wald χ

**

2

0.005

1.648

0.010

0.003

154.574
2

Pseudo R

-0.791

3.793***
***

18.49%

**

-2.288

-0.800

3.723***

1.662

0.006

0.003

***

154.365

18.40%

**

-2.326

3.799***

1.718

0.007

0.010

***

154.612

18.49%

3.911***
0.023
***

155.997

18.65%

The estimates are based on the Logit method. The dependent variable is MAO, a dummy variable indicating that client firm receives a modified opinion. RELSIZE is
defined as: Sizei, -1/∑Sizei, -1, where Sizei, -1 is the size of audit firm i in year -1, and ∑Sizei, -1 is the sum of firm size for audit firms involved in a merger. Audit firm size is
measured by the number of listed clients or the total assets of listed clientele (in logarithm form) audited by the firms. Other independent variables are defined as in Table
3. The Z-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by client firms.
For the continuous specification, RELSIZE is measured continuously. For the rank specification, RELSIZE is transformed to tercile ranks (from 0 to 2) and then divided by
2.
* **

, , and *** denote two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
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FIGURE 1
Relative frequency of modified audit opinions for the population of Chinese listed firms from 1993 to 2006
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The relative frequencies are calculated as the number of modified audit opinions (including unqualified with
explanatory notes) divided by the total number of listed firms at the end of the respective year.
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